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This article expands on an earlier concept of horror autotoxicus linked to digital 
contagions of spam and network Virality.1  It aims to present, as such, a broader 
conception of cosmic topologies of imitation (CTI) intended to better grasp the relatively 
new practices of social media marketing. Similar to digital autotoxicity, CTI provide the 
perfect medium for sharing while also spreading contagions that can potentially 
contaminate the medium itself. However, whereas digital contagions are perhaps limited 
to the toxicity of a technical layer of information viruses, the contagions of CTI are an all 
pervasive auto-toxicity which can infect human bodies and technologies increasingly in 
concert with each other. This is an exceptional autotoxicus that significantly blurs the 
immunological line of exemption between self and nonself, and potentially, the 
anthropomorphic distinction between individual self and collective others. 
 
This earlier work on digital culture discussed the significant role of contagion in virus 
writing cultures and online communication practices, where, in short, the tendency for 
codes and communication messages to spread like viruses on a network inspired an 
extremely profitable anti-virus industry and nascent viral marketing business. On one 
hand, biological analogies ushered in an anti-virus discursive formation that determined, 
to some extent, what people can and cannot do on a network by distinguishing between 
good and bad digital code in a similar way to which organic immune systems are 
assumed to exempt the threat posed by anomalous nonself cells from those of the self. On 
the other hand though, prediscursive forces were identified in the social spreading of 
biologically derived anxieties linked to these appeals to immunity and efforts made to 
trigger affective contagions associated with viral marketing practices.  Indeed, in many 
ways the concept of horror autotoxicus was initially introduced as a way to explain how 
immunologic inspired digital systems become vulnerable to viral communication 
environments in which contagious anomalies are constituent rather than exempt. In this 
context, autoimmunity is a useful concept because it challenges the immunologic 
principles of the self/nonself binary relation and helps to identify discursive formations 
and prediscursive forces that arrange social relations by way of contamination rather than 
immunity. Indeed, taken forward to an all-pervasive corporate social media era in which 
a second wave of viral marketing has arguably come of age, this article revisits horror 
autotoxicus to argue that the virality of digital culture can now be grasped through a 
prevailing auto-toxicity of the social.  
 
In a very concrete fashion the now infamous Facebook research on emotional contagion 
in 2014 (discussed below) evidences how a continued focus on contagion theory adds to a 
much needed critical study of digital culture. The rise of corporate social media in the last 
decade has indeed necessitated a reenergizing of these critical approaches. As follows, 
Langlois and Elmer distinguish between three different yet intertwined approaches that 
are significant to this discussion.2  Firstly, the virality of social media is closely related to 
a critical economy approach that understands corporate endeavours to mine social life 
through appeals to such things as emotional, felt and affective user experiences with 
software. Social media does more than merely capture the attention of users and sell it on 
to marketers. It produces user performances that marketers can readily mine, manipulate 
and nudge into action. Secondly, the conceptual work developed in this article is directly 
linked to empirical work focused on the algorithms that function behind the scenes on 
social media platforms. The conceptualization of CTI therefore recognizes how 
capricious affective contagions are nudged into action by way of analytics triggered by, 
for example, a click on a like or share button. Lastly, by helping to illuminate the 
manipulation of affective user experiences at the interface of corporate social media this 
discussion feeds into a third software activist approach to corporate social media with a 
view to awakening ‘new user agencies’3 beyond those social relations already configured 
by corporate marketers. 
 
Rethinking Immunity through Autoimmunity 
 
Autoimmunity is a concept that explores beyond earlier territorializations of 
immunological exemption to ever more complex stratagems that tap into contagious 
social arrangements in digital culture. Yet, it is important to begin by noting that 
autoimmunity is not opposed to immunologic. To grasp its full purchase we need to 
approach autoimmunity by thinking through immunology. As set out in this special issue, 
autoimmunity is conventionally studied within the field of immunology. The concept 
refers to an immunologic phenomenon whereby an organism mounts an immune 
response against its own tissues; a paradoxical situation in which self-defence (immunity, 
protection) manifests as self-harm (pathology). Today, the term autoimmunity is used to 
account for any instance in which the body fails to recognise its own constituents as 'self', 
an error that results in self-harm or injury.  
 
Autoimmunity is however regarded as a controversial concept within immunology. It is 
important, as such, to grasp the flaws in Paul Ehrlich’s original concept of horror 
autotoxicus. To begin with, in crude terms autoimmunity is posited as an impossibility 
because all organisms are so horrified by self-discrimination that they will selectively 
avoid self-toxicity. The later discovery of the harsh realities of autoimmune disease 
seemingly demonstrate deep problems in the natural preservation of an organic unity 
based on the overriding rule of self-tolerance. There are nonetheless those working in 
immunology who argue that Elrich’s theory is misunderstood and that while self-
tolerance is evidently the rule, autoimmunity is always the exception.4 Moreover, it is 
further argued that rather than being a destructive incongruity of the immune system, the 
exception is always implicated in the maintenance of the rule.5 In other words, the self-
destructive anomaly is considered to play a productive role in the evolutionary survival of 
the organism.  
 
Putting evolutionary determined equilibrium aside for now, the paradoxical relation 
between self and nonself in autoimmunity problematizes the assumed emergence of a 
natural state of immunity. The defences provided by the horror of self-toxicity will, on 
occasion, acquiesce, and the exception will overrule self-tolerance, possibly leading to 
the exceptional destruction of the organism. As follows, there is an ongoing debate 
concerning the value of the self/non-self metaphor as a theoretical tool to understand how 
cellular organisms defend against infections in immunology. For some, the metaphor’s 
value plunged when it became evident that cells have the potential to be simultaneously 
anti-self and anti-foreign.  Indeed, cellular behaviour seems to defy the terms set out by 
the immunological metaphor. As Robert S. Schwartz puts it, ‘the immune system, in 
short, does not operate by anthropomorphic principles such as “learn,” “self,” and 
“foreign,” nor is there a sharp line between “self” and “foreign.”’6 
 
Taking this challenge to immunologic a step further, autoimmunity also questions how 
these same anthropomorphic principles are assumed to arrange social relations. In other 
words, similarly considered in terms of a broader concept, autoimmunity significantly 
complicates notions of communication, defence and regulation conventionally 
understood as immunologic processes.  As follows, the concept prompts a novel approach 
that questions the ordering of social relations according to self/other relations. It tests the 
permeability of borders assumed to exist between self-identity and threats posed by an 
anomalous destructive nonself. As such, autoimmunity introduces a politics of exception, 
which unlike the negative binarisms of immunological exemption, can be grasped as an 
affirmative process. 
 
The destructive and productive role of the viral anomaly in digital culture has been 
described as a topological spatiotemporal autotoxicity.7 This is ‘a condition akin to a 
horror autotoxicus of the digital network’, wherein the ‘capacity of the network to 
propagate its own imperfections exceeds the metaphor with natural unity’.8 Considered in 
stark contrast to immunologic, the topology of the digital network is the ‘perfect medium’ 
for spreading both ‘perfection and imperfection’.9 The goal now, it would seem (given 
that the virality of the digital network has become ever more interwoven with the social 
in so many profound ways), is to question how a more generalized concept of 
autoimmunity might be applied to social arrangements that occur when bodies and 
technologies are increasingly in concert with each other. Beyond digital contagion, it 
would seem, we encounter CTI. This is not just a digital infrastructure that confuses self 
and nonself, but mixtures of technologies and bodies that become socially arranged 
according to autotoxicity.  
 
The notion that self/nonself relations are in a perpetual state of paradox is evidently 
nothing new. In order to grasp autoimmunity in this broader topological sense we do not 
need to look much further than Gabriel Tarde to resuscitate a social theory in which 
capricious contagious overspills are not regarded as anomalous, but become key to the 
arrangement of everyday social relations.10 Along these lines, relations do not simply 
become contagious; they are contagions. The arrangement of everyday relations 
established between humans and the world they inhabit are determined, as follows, by 
Tarde’s imitative radiation. The CTI concept expands on this notion to ask what happens 
to the concept of self-identity when, as Tarde argued, the psychological sense of ‘myself’ 
is considered to be contaminated by the imitations of others.11 In other words, what 
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happens when the self is understood to imitate the other to a point at which the relation 
between self and other - so important to both immunologic and anthropomorphic 
principles - collapses into a social cosmos of imitative relationality? Moreover, what 
occurs to social arrangements when the exception of self-toxicity is no longer considered 
an anomaly, but becomes the rule? Indeed, in a twenty first century social media world 
dominated by the contaminating sensory environments of market capitalism, it is 
arguably no longer self-harm that should concern us, but a tendency toward what Roger 
Caillois calls collective masochism.12 To establish this theoretical perspective I will again 
look to manifestations of digital culture; specifically, in this case, social media marketing, 
as a way to grasp how CTI can be used to rethink an age that is increasingly defined by 
radical self/nonself relations encountered in contagious social arrangements. 
 
Mirrors, Mimicry and Marketing 
 
Before exploring what the concept of CTI can achieve, it is necessary to trace the ways in 
which self/other relations have featured in academic marketing literature. To be begin 
with, it is important to note that a Tardean approach has made some impact on the study 
of marketing in terms of grasping, for example, the significance of pass-on-power, as 
well as co-production, affect and sentiment in consumption.13 But for the most part there 
is a marked tendency in more industry focused literature in particular to analyze the self-
concept in conventional ways that render it discrete in terms of how it interacts with 
others in sensory environments. At first glance, this discreteness is subtly conceived of. 
For instance, according to a recent academic study of adolescent photo sharing on social 
media the self and its interaction with others in the external world is considered ‘integral 
to the creation and continuation of a stable harmonious self-concept’.14 Adolescents in 
particular are assumed to upload and share photos of themselves adorned in various 
products as a way to crystalize the formation of their self-identity to present to others.15 
However, this account of identity formation relies on a supposition that although self-
identity admits to social relations, the inner sense of self exists regardless of the external 
world.16 The notion that adolescents mimic others they encounter, by way of adorning 
similar cloths, is often downplayed, as such. In this kind of account the other functions 
mainly as a kind of collective mirror to help the adolescent grapple with the question: 
who am I? Group associations are important, but the self-concept is defined 
predominantly by representational internal choices made about these social associations, 
alongside apparently wilful consumption preferences for clothing, jargon, and music 
taste, for example.  
 
This supposition is challenged by Tarde who insists that the imitations we find in these 
external relations should be the main focus of social theory. Indeed, Tarde countered 
individual and collective representations by presupposing ‘exactly what needs explaining, 
namely, "the similarity of millions of people."‘17 This is why, Deleuze and Guattari 
contend, ‘Tarde was interested instead in the world of detail, or of the infinitesimal: the 
little imitations, oppositions, and inventions constituting an entire realm of 
subrepresentative matter’.18 From a Tardean perspective there is indeed no need for a 
representational mirror to ensure that collective mimicry takes place. Arguably these 
mirroring processes present nothing more than a dream-of-action that supports an illusory 
boundary line between inner psychological experience of self and the outer world. To be 
sure, the aim of current social media marketing strategies is not, arguably, to infect the 
desire for a stable sense of the self, but rather leech the porosity of the psychological self-
image to the imitative radiations of the external world. It is this porosity to imitation that 
is readily exploited by marketers able to tap into big data assemblages providing a trace 
of (and adding a value to) what is imitated i.e. trending, shared, liked etc. That is to say, 
social media marketers do not infect the self, but rather harvest and activate a contagious 
social medium. It is this Tardean tendency toward social contamination and imitative 
radiation that marketers readily tap into (and encourage) in order to develop strategies of 
social influence. 
 
Before expanding more on this tendency it is necessary to further grasp the role mirrors 
and mimicry have played in critical approaches to marketing that in many ways echo the 
immunologic. The inclination to lean on discrete concepts of self/other relations in recent 
marketing literature can certainly be traced back to much earlier attempts to decode the 
ideology of marketers working mainly in advertising in the 1960s and 70s. For instance, 
Judith Williamson’s radical thesis on advertising introduces the Lacanian influenced 
concept of the ‘Created Self’; arguing that the ideological intention of the marketer is to 
bring together groups of consumers, while at the same time individuating (and alienating) 
them.19 That is, creating a brand message that becomes an integrated part of a coherent 
sense of self to a point wherein the self becomes a commodity. Adverts that feature Pepsi 
People, for example, create an imaginary social medium, which offers the individual a 
Lacanian mirror-image of the external world to gaze into and aspire to.20 It is the aim of 
marketers to draw consumers into a desire to become one of the Pepsi People in order to 
feel good. But, evidently, such social aspirations and desires for perpetual happiness are 
delusional. This is how ideology is supposed to simultaneously provide a false image to 
mimic, while also individuating and alienating the sense of self. Indeed, Williamson sees 
Lacan’s mirror as a metaphor for the external reflection of the self advertisers produce – 
an ersatz imitation of sorts – encountered in the external world that estranges the self 
from the other.21 Nonetheless, despite its recognition of the external world, ideological 
advertising is significantly grasped like a mechanism of infection in which ‘it is so crucial 
for the ad to enter you, and exist inside rather than outside your self-image: in fact, to 
create it’.22 Like the basis of Lacan’s account of the mirror-image, the organism is, at 
first, so captivated by the external environment that it becomes its camouflage. In other 
words, mimicry is the capture of the organism by the environment rather than some 
evolutionary necessity to mimic surroundings in order to survive. But eventually this loss 
of self to the external world through captivation is transferred from the externality of the 
environment – bodily affects, camouflage etc. – to the inner world of phantasy – the 
narcissism of the ego and its false identification with the other. This is how, in short, 
bodily affects become phantasy in Lacan’s mirror stage  
 
To expand on this point we can see how differences and resemblances become important 
factors in determining an individuated self/other relation in the ideological analysis of 
advertising. Resemblances are located in the mirror images of people that appeal to you: 
people like you. Adolescent and adult consumers can, as such, compare themselves to the 
other, creating a sense of coherence that resonates with the brands they consume. But, at 
the same time, differences in ideological analysis are also found in the semiotic 
signification of the self/other relation. That is to say, the glimpse of the other (in the 
mirror-image of the ad) points to what you cannot be. Just as one cannot occupy the 
space of the mirror, one can never be happy all of the time. So despite the mimicry, the 
mirror-image makes consumers aware of what they are not. It makes them cognizant of 
their separation from the other and the environment they inhabit.23 Advertising is not only 
an infection of the inner world, it applies a kind of immunologic exemption to self/other 
relations insofar as the mirror-image isolates self from nonself and self from external 
world; producing an illusory, but stable sense of a narcissistic self-identity into which 
products and brands can be readily inserted. To be sure, Williamson regards the dream of 
a coherent self to be the object of the consumer’s desire. Marketing consequently feeds 
on this desire for what is ultimately an unobtainable stability. This is the ideological 
creation of an infected self-concept, wherein the sense of self becomes a product in itself; 
the creation of a commodified self, no less.  
 
There are some important variations in the ideological-semiotic analysis of advertising 
and Tarde’s imitation thesis that need to be ironed out before we can fully explore 
autoimmunity. To begin with, although similar in some respects to Williamson’s account, 
insofar as the object of desire is an illusory sense of self, what composes the dream of 
action in Tarde’s society of imitation is not determined by a Lacanian mirror that gives 
rise to the representation of I. On the contrary, the object of Tardean desire is always 
belief. Again, there are subtle differences here that need to be considered. While beliefs 
may seem to offer a sense of inner stability, what is believed in is always imitated from 
the beliefs of others. The illusory sense of self acquired through mimicry is not therefore 
a representation of I in a mirror, but a contagious flow of imitated belief experienced at a 
sub-representational level. In other words, the sense of an inner coherence or self-
identity, which seems to separate the inner world from the external world, is the illusion. 
It is a dream of volition; a sense of self experienced in the reverie of social associations. 
The beliefs that are mimicked; that are imagined to belong to a self, belong to a social 
medium. 
 
To further think through these differences in immunological orientated terms it is 
important to go back to the origins of Williamson’s use of the Lacanian mirror. Lacan 
was famously inspired by Caillois’s work on insects, fish, octopuses and mantises, and 
his significant challenge to the prevalent idea that mimicry is an instinctual form of 
protective immunity brought about by threats posed to the organism from the outside 
world. That is to say, the adaptable surface (or skin) of the animal becomes the first level 
of immunological defence. Rather than seeing these surface mimicries as protection for 
the organism against the external threat of the other, Caillois alternatively points to the 
many vulnerabilities that arise when the surface of an organism takes on the visual 
properties of its environment. The remains of mimetic insects are indeed as abundant in 
the stomachs of predators as those that cannot change their visual appearance.24 Caillois 
therefore begins to rethink the organism’s mimicry of the environment not as a survival 
tactic, but as a capture of the subject in the spatial coordinates of its surroundings; an 
individual captured in a topology. As Parikka notes, ‘Caillois addressed the function of 
mimicry not as a representation of figures or space but a spatial assemblage that bordered 
on disorder’.25 Mimicry is all about ‘bodies in interaction’ with the environment; that is, a 
relation between the haptic visual properties of space and affected bodies.26 Indeed, 
Parikka goes on to ponder a notion of affective relationality that in many ways counters 
the mirror stage insofar as it draws attention to the porous nature of the inside/outside 
relation to such an extent that the representational I is replaced by the space of the 
environment.27 The inner and outer world of phenomenological experience is therefore 
collapsed into an external world of affective relationality that disturbs the relation 
between personality and space. ‘The reflective mind is forced to follow the noncognitive 
knowledge and motility of the body… [Caillois thus provides] a nonphenomenological 
mode of understanding the lived topology of the event’.28 
 
Williamson’s approach borrows from Lacan’s reading of Caillois to argue that the outside 
image alienates the psychological self. However, there needs to be distinction made 
between the notion of advertising entering into, and occupying, the inner world of the 
consumer and a counter notion of a mimicry of bodily affects that challenges the self-
concept by locating social relations in a sensory environment.  In other words, the 
ideological critique insists on the production of an inner personality (however delusional) 
while a nonphenomenological approach offers a theory of subjectivity produced by the 
capturing of individuals in space. The changes on the surface of the organism’s body 
need not therefore become internalized in a reflective mind. As Caillois puts it, ‘the 
feeling of personality, considered as the organism's feeling of distinction from its 
surroundings, of the connection between consciousness and a particular point in space, 
cannot fail under these conditions to be seriously undermined’.29 
 
There also needs to be a historical footnote added to this discussion which entertains a 
considerably older notion of infectious social relations and its increasing relevance to an 
understanding of social media marketing today. Indeed, again, there is nothing entirely 
new here. Although the apparent contagiousness of the nineteenth century crowds that 
inform Tarde’s imitation thesis predate the mediated publics of the twentieth century, the 
objectives of twenty first century social media marketers seem to parasite the same 
externalized contagious tendencies he recognized. From this perspective, marketers do 
not need to infiltrate the self via the mirrors and mimicry of ideology, but instead they tap 
into the contagious social medium in which consumer beliefs about products and brands 
are readily passed on as affective contagions. As follows, marketing is not the creation of 
self-identity, but rather the production of sensory environments in which the contagions 
of a social medium can be encouraged. The social medium becomes the product. Social 
media is indeed an invention which appropriates desires always-already spreading 
through the external world.  
 
Social Media Marketing as Autoimmunity 
 
The potential exploitation of a contagious social medium can be readily observed in an 
experiment carried out by Facebook in 2014. This involved the manipulation of the 
emotional content of news feeds and measuring the effect these manipulations had on the 
emotions of 689,003 members of the social media phenomenon in terms of how 
contagious they became.30 The researchers who carried out the experiment found that 
when they reduced the positive expressions displayed by other users they produced less 
positive and more negative posts. Likewise, when negative expressions were reduced, the 
opposite pattern occurred. Although the recorded levels of contagion were rather paltry 
the researchers concluded that the ‘emotions expressed by others on Facebook influence 
our own emotions, constituting experimental evidence for massive-scale contagion via 
social networks’.31 Indeed, even if this contentious and unethical attempt by Facebook to 
influence moods produced meagre evidence of contagion, the design and implementation 
of the experiment itself should alert us to a potentially Huxleyesque mode of mass 
manipulation. As Nicolas Carr contends, the bizarrely titled ‘Experimental Evidence of 
Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion’ through Social Networks draws attention to the 
way in which the cultivation of big data by marketers treats human subjects like lab rats 
while also pointing to the widespread nature of manipulation by social media companies. 
‘What was most worrisome about the study’, Carr contends, ‘lay not in its design or its 
findings, but in its ordinariness’.32 This kind of research is indeed part of a ‘visible tip of 
an enormous and otherwise well-concealed iceberg’ in the social media industry.33 To be 
sure, the one thing that both the disparagers and apologists for social media seem to agree 
on is that user manipulation is rife on the internet. It is, after all, what every social media 
business enterprise strives to do.  
 
Social media networks are the perfect medium for sharing and, it would seem, a test bed, 
or nursery, for cultivating and igniting emotional contagions. Unlike broadcast media, 
which similarly spread emotions, the users of these networks are predisposed, it would 
seem, to routinely share their feelings in exchange for the tools that allow them to freely 
do so without concern for how these tools might, in turn, be used to manipulate them. Of 
course, despite the relatively small scale media storm of outrage surrounding this 
particular attempt to manipulate emotions, many Facebook users will be oblivious to their 
participation in this research, or indeed, their assumed inclination to respond to emotional 
suggestion in such an apparently porous and imitative fashion. Moreover, most Facebook 
users will be unaware of the role their ignited emotional responses play in an infectious 
social medium; oblivious to, that is, the way in which emotions are being harvested in the 
data assemblages mined by corporate social media.  
 
Beyond these ethical concerns, Facebook’s emotional contagion research can also be 
grasped as part of a trajectory of digital autoimmunity. Indeed, ever since the invention of 
the online marketplace, marketers have arguably striven to emulate the infectiousness of 
biological and computer viruses so as to surreptitiously spread marketing messages 
through social networks unawares. These efforts can be seen as a part of two waves of 
viral marketing in which marketers have increasingly lent on the idea that an infected 
host will pass on a message more effectively through its own networks than it would 
through conventional media channels. Although the ignition of virality is never certain, in 
the first wave, the low cost of viral marketing was a good enough incentive, it would 
seem, for business enterprises to switch from expensive broadcast media to viral 
networks. Moreover, the prospect of evading the conscious tyranny of mass marketing by 
simultaneously secreting away messages in everyday communications and turning 
consumers into the medium for potential contagions also offered novel unconscious 
neural pathways for marketers to spread their messages. 
 
The Facebook research on emotional contagion represents a considerable development on 
the immunological and memetic theoretical models that underpinned the first wave of 
cost effective viral marketing. Indeed, whereas the template for the first wave was based 
on a configuration of virulent memes and immunological disease thresholds the second 
wave seems to sidestep the defensive horror of autotoxicus by looking to collapse the 
immunological distinctions between self, nonself and the social medium in which they 
become assembled. Perhaps this shift from a first to a second wave of viral marketing can 
be best observed in recent challenges to the immunologic model posed from within 
marketing itself.34 This is a challenge to the notion that the trigger for contagious 
overspills can be found in network clusters that develop around influential and 
promiscuous individuals. Here Malcolm Gladwell’s crude version of threshold theory is 
used to explain the point at which a small trend tips over into a big contagion. That is, 
wherein the number of infected nodes outlives the number of uninfected nodes. A 
mainstay of viral marketing, Gladwell’s Tipping Point thesis is nevertheless confronted 
by Duncan Watts’s contention that contagions are the product of the ‘infectability of the 
networked world’.35 This is a point of departure that has not been overlooked by social 
media marketers. The research focus has in fact signiﬁcantly shifted away from 
inﬂuential nodes toward the design and production of infectable small world networks 
that prime mood and ignite capricious affective contagions.36 
 
Despite initial claims to have captured what gets passed on in a social network in 
practical terms, first wave viral marketing was still pushing messages out to an online 
audience paying attention to websites in much the same way as they would mass media. 
Designers were engaged in producing sticky experiences that encouraged the cultural 
practice of passing on content. The big difference with social media today is that it rouses 
the passing on of viral content through such tactics as following, liking, sharing etc., 
ensuring that complex and capricious contagions are more readily mined and prompted 
into action. In current big data research there is a continuing focus on producing small 
changes intended to lead to large scale contagions. For example, in the work of Watts we 
see how exceptional contagions are, and how, as such, the affective priming and 
manipulation of the mood of the social medium becomes the main focus. It is not 
therefore the infected subject that matters, but rather the capricious encounters in 
affective atmospheres that might ignite contagion.  
 
Autoimmunity as Collective Masochism 
 
To add a Tardean slant to these developments, we might say that the second wave of viral 
marketing denotes the dissolution of the infected subject into CTI. The infectious 
mimicry of autoimmunity is, as such, no longer (borrowing from immunology again) 
about self-harm; it is perhaps, following Caillois, all about collective masochism: 
phenomenon he located in the sensory environments of mimicking animals. 
 
[T]here are cases in which mimicry causes the creature to go from bad to 
worse: geometer-moth caterpillars simulate shoots of shrubbery so well that 
gardeners cut them with their pruning shears. The case of the Phyllia is even 
sadder: they browse among themselves, taking each other for real leaves, in 
such a way that one might accept the idea of a sort of collective masochism 
leading to mutual homophagy, the simulation of the leaf being a provocation 
to cannibalism in this kind of totem feast.37  
 
The point is that as the market colonizes and absorbs the sensory environment in which 
human mimicry takes place, these molecular imitations will inevitably become more 
oriented toward mimicking products and brands. In other words, mimicry is an outcome 
of the capture of subjectivity by the space of the market. Significantly, this is not a 
subject that can freely identify with an I within space, since it is the space itself that 
positions the subject in the market. Unlike Williamson’s focus on commodification of the 
self, which occurs inside the subject, we need to look to the topological relations that 
capture subjectivity. This point can be expanded upon by returning to the adolescent 
photo-sharing experiences discussed above. We can see here how young consumers, 
adorned in the products and brands they find in the shopping malls, spread their mimicry 
of the sensory environment via social media to CTI that prompt more consumers to 
become coordinates in the topological grid of the market. In classic Tardean terms then, 
this is imitative radiation; it is a molecular mimicry that helps to explain the similarity of 
millions of people. As Caillois similarly puts it, we find a kind of magic attraction in 
these topologies in which ‘like produces like’.38 
 
In the first wave of viral marketing the infected body becomes the marketing message. It 
is, in itself, the virus that passes on the message. The infected body becomes the host 
medium of contagion. In the second wave the relation between self and nonself has not 
only become more blurred in a topological sense; it has also been captured by the space 
of the market. It is not the body, but the social medium that is now the virus. Indeed, by 
way of occupying the sensory environments in which relations are made, the market has 
laid down the spatial and temporal conditions of social arrangements. It influences, in this 
way, what gets imitated and what gets passed on. Williamson’s response to this capture 
of subjectivity by the space of the market is to try to decode the infected self; that is to 
say, grasp the creation of the self by the market. The intention is, it seems, to provide the 
individual with the semiotic tools with which to see through the ideological trickery of 
advertising. However, when consumers become the medium of infection the sense of an 
inside being infiltrated by an outside becomes lost in the spatial capture of a topology. 
There is no incoming message to decode. Indeed, consumers are no longer able to decode 
marketing messages since they have become participants in an infectable space in which 
they co-produce and pass on code. The second wave is profound in this sense, since it is 
no longer the market that directly infects, but consumer collectives that indirectly infect 
others in their neighbour. Facebook’s emotional research creates, as such, a topology, not 
a self, in which looping affective relations, ignited by online content (newsfeeds), spread 
through pass-on power. The big data lab rat unconsciously becomes part of a mischief of 
rats oblivious to the viruses they carry and seemingly insensible to the prospect of 
becoming an active carrier for brand messages.  
 
Autoimmunity, Anxiety and Transindividuality 
 
Becoming viral is still a practice embraced in marketing circles, which builds on the 
popular discourses of gurus like Gladwell and Watts and is sold on as a commodity in the 
form of the best seller, the business seminar and Ted Talk. But a second wave of viral 
marketing needs to be grasped as part of a more general and shifting immunological 
discursive formation, which at first territorialized populations around the visceral fear of 
the nonself, but now ignites a wider range of contagions including many joyful 
encounters with affective capitalism. Yet, despite this reorientation, immunologic anxiety 
has not entirely disappeared from view. The blissfully unaware Facebook lab rats might 
one day wake up from their somnambulistic stupor. The anxiety experienced will not be 
the outcome of a realization that the sense of self has been occupied by the market 
because, as we have seen, this is not the nature of the spatial capture of subjectivity. The 
anxiety felt will, in contrast, be experienced through the terrifying apprehension that the 
space occupied (and mimicked) is a dream of action. Indeed, as is argued below, it is the 
conditions of CTI in the social medium itself that causes new anxieties to unfold. Social 
media activists and researchers alike need to therefore better understand the dynamics of 
this topological spatial capture. 
 
The relational arrangements between individuals and the topological space they occupy 
requires a radical rethink. Developing on Parikka’s reading of Gilbert Simondon, we 
might begin by considering CTI not as a spatial backdrop in which communication takes 
place, but rather as ‘an active milieu of relations’.39 This is a topological space that 
mediatizes the individual; producing intensive individuation processes that ‘situate the 
subject in the world’.40 In the novel social arrangements of this space, the prediscursive 
anxieties relating to contagion experienced in the immunologic model are substituted by 
new anxieties concerning the extent to which already infected bodies becomes part of a 
seemingly inescapable contagious social medium. That is, a sudden realization that what 
was regarded as a sense of ownership over the psychological self, which seemed to 
belong to the I, is in fact part of a shared data assemblage steered by the market 
researchers at Facebook. The trending posts we saw that made us laugh, get angry and 
cry; the posts we passed on to our friends and followers as shares and likes. They were 
mostly ersatz experiences. This is a moment of anxiety when the individual becomes 
aware that they are part of a collective virus and actively engaged in passing it on by way 
of their interactions with others. These are moments of anxiety when individuals become 
‘aware of their presence as part of the ‘informational collective’ that shapes online 
activity’ and emotional experiences.41 This is perhaps akin to a Simondonian anxiety 
wherein the difference between individuality and collectivity collapses into an affective 
state of transindividuality.42 
 
Immunity to Relational Media 
 
Back in 2006, the information architect and design consultant, Adam Greenfield, drew 
our attention to a near future digital culture in which ubiquitous computing makes 
everyday life ‘fiercely relational’.43 Pervasive computing introduces a lived relationality 
that is not simply experienced when individuals become a set of values stored in a 
database. This is already a reality we find in our experiences with social media. But it 
will also be increasingly realized in the way in which such values, including spatial 
proximity to points of consumption, location traces and emotional dispositions, are 
matched against the values belonging to others. As computing becomes ever more 
ubiquitous these relational values will exert a ‘transformative influence’ on social 
relations.44 Indeed, if we are to follow, as Greenfield does, Erving Goffman’s notion that 
we are all actors wearing a collection of masks we switch between in order to manage 
self-identities exposed to ever changing social situations, then we need to grasp how 
relational media threatens to make the sustaining of different masks ‘untenable’.45 In the 
age of social media, the personal in computing has certainly moved into the social 
domain where the private and public performances of Goffman’s masked actors collapse 
into data-bodies assembled by relational databases. 
 
Beyond Greenfield’s account, however, we might also venture that relational media 
draws attention to a much older problem than who controls the ‘custody of self-
consciousness.46 That is; the problem of what happens to individual and collective 
experiences when exposed to all-pervasive technology. This problem clearly maps onto 
the shift in immunological orientation highlighted in this article. Indeed, given the 
proclivity of social media, and pervasive computing, toward autotoxicity, it is the 
relational aspects of immunology, particularly with regard to the sensory relations 
established between humans and technology, which require attention. It is therefore with 
Ellis and Tucker’s recent social psychology reading of Simondon’s technics that I now 
conclude with, since as they appropriately claim, not enough work had been done on this 
relation.47 To begin with, the point needs to be made that although social media adapts 
the way in which a person experiences individuating events, following Simondon, the 
focus on the individual must not be confused with the constituted being. Thus as personal 
life increasingly shifts from individuals to the huge databases of governments and 
commercial organizations, the intersection between humans and technology unfolds as 
part of processes of individuation, which do not have to be human.48 As Ellis and Tucker 
note, Simondon does not ontologically, as such, separate bodies and technology because 
both are part of the experience of individuation.49 Indeed, human and technological 
individuations are the threshold point at which human dreams and machines become 
mixed. However, this is not to say that a nightmarish tension or deep anxiety does not 
exist in this coming together of bodily and technological arrangements. As they assemble, 
something novel and unknown emerges.  
 
As is the case with immunology, the psychic self becomes a conceptual problem that 
cannot be defined by internal properties alone. It is rather an affective relation, produced 
through processes, not separate categories. Similarly, like Tarde’s imitative subjectivity, 
an individual ‘always-already carries some of the collective with it’.50 The resulting 
anxiety is not therefore equivalent to the alienation established between immunological 
self and nonself, or is it, for that matter, akin to Williamson’s alienating mirror image. On 
the contrary, this is anxiety felt as an outcome of the ‘coming together’ of technologies 
and bodies, forming new collective arrangements and experiences that challenge 
immunological, and potentially anthropomorphic, divisions. This is not a tension-free 
experience since the individual psyche always-already experiences collective baggage as 
an anxiety. In autoimmunity terms this is perhaps a new kind of horror that emerges 
through an experience that is both individual and collective – self and nonself – at the 
same time. That is what Simondon refers to as the preindividual. In other words, anxiety 
arises through an unresolvable perceptual problem of individuation and preindividuation. 
This occurs because of ‘the reality that the individual experiences itself as a unique 
subject, but at the same time recognises itself as partially collective’.51 Returning to the 
example of the Facebook lab rat, it is the revelatory experience of realising that our 
emotional experiences are not ours that produces a new horror. 
 
How then to overcome the anxieties ignited in the experiences of CTI? One consideration 
might be to continue to follow Simondon’s solution to anxiety in the concept of the 
transindividual.  This is not a reconstitution of individual or collective categories. As 
Ellis and Tucker point out, anxiety cannot be resolved inside the subject or the 
collective.52 It requires a perceptual bridge that might enable a softer passage through the 
individual-collective continuum. This is a bridge that counters internal and external 
spaces, working across boundaries of self and nonself. Moreover, the transindividual 
escapes spatial coordinates – it is not a grid, it is a becoming, which may indeed frustrate 
the colonising spaces of market orientated mimicry. It might, as such, provide the basis of 
a relational immune system (RIS) that does not look to perceive of something that exists 
outside the self as a nonself, but perceives of a ‘multiplicity of perceptual worlds’.53 It is 
this notion of a RIS that needs more work. Indeed, in contrast to the binary between the 
phenomenological I and the crowd brains of mass psychology there needs to be an 
investigation into these relational bridges that span across multiple perceptual worlds. 
This might lead to a critical social psychology of the transindividual which invests in care 
systems designed to lessen the anxiety of transindividuation as well as defending against 
the horror of marketing contagions intended to surreptitiously piggyback the imitative 
nature of this relation.  
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